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(EDITOR'S NOTE: Charles Black, Enquirer military writer, reports from Vietnam on his fifth assignment in the Far East. On his way to the war zone he has visited various military hot spots throughout the world.)
DI AN, Vietnam - The war has been different every time I came to Vietnam, and this trip is no exception.
In 1964, the shooting was in the Mekong Delta, but the ominous presence of the 325th North Vietnamese Division signaled a change when one visited the coastal plains around Bong Son or Quang Ngai.
In 1965, it was a surging, rolling, violent drama which continued unchecked as the 1st Air Cavalry Division fought from Chu Pong Mountain by Cambodia to Operation Masher-White Wing on the South China Sea.
In 1966 the action in battle was still in II Corps, with the political-religious machinations being played out at Saigon, Hue and Da Nang almost obscuring the conflict.
In 1967, the story in II Corps was one of military success which the Vietnamese government and the U.S. civilian effort (the many alphabetical agencies charged with waging "the other war") failed to take advantage of, but which was won in spite of their failure.
Then there was an obvious story developing in I Corps where the end results of the much touted exclave strategy were being demonstrated in a process which climaxed at Khe Sanh and the change in command and tactics up there.
Then came Tet and everything centered on Saigon - that center of headquarters pomp and lard, politics and chicanery, ignorance and anguish, dime-a-dozen strategies, and million-dollar-tactics was attacked.
The fighting was frenzied and when the enemy was finally beaten back he left dead men by the thousands behind. But he had also taken a bite out of the big, fat, hind end of this war, wounded the delicate psyche of U.S. politicians, voters and television viewers, and changed the course of the conflict.
It was obvious that if he could do it all one more time, with the effort a little less a complete military debacle but as full of psychological overkill, that the wild illogic of an election year would take over. Common sense is not a notable trait in the best of these years and for waging a special kind of war in a very subtle fashion, 1968 is not the best of them imaginable.
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He tried in May but was either over-cautious or couldn't muster the force to do it right. He lost horribly again, this time without the psychological payoff he achieved in Tet to balance the books.
Any new offense he launched after the Tet do-or-die attempt would look bad by comparison if it didn't produce more death, destruction and publicity. Only Saigon would suffice. Only a bigger blow would add to the effect of Tet.
Had To Be Halted
The U.S. and Vietnamese forces had to stop such a success before it happened, not simply beat it back after it was launched but spoil its launching, intercept it, defeat it outside of Saigon.
The alternative all belonged to the enemy. Public reaction in the U.S., domestic and world politics, the continued sanctuary allowed the enemy in Cambodia, all tied the most mobile army in military history to a defensive mission.
Inside the defensive definition, of course, there could be tremendous movement and dramatic fighting done across the breadth of Vietnam, only forty miles or so at the critical areas in question.
But there apparently would be no Inchon landing type of master stroke. The Cambodian bases, the reason why fighting has continued in this country since 1966, could have been closed once but diplomats frittered those chances away.
Saigon would be defended. That was obviously the story of the war in the time I could spend in Vietnam in 1968.
The 3rd Squadron of the 17th Air Cavalry was obviously the best place for me to see it, because of a dozen different reasons. Some of these included:
Sentiment for the mode of fighting, the presence of daily military adventure which this kind of outfit fought, the fact that the 3rd Squadron was the eyes and ears (and often the first fist) of the force drawn up in defense, the fact that the unit was in operation from the Rung Sat Zone swamps south and east of Saigon to the plateaus and rubber forests over by Cambodia, and many other reasons.
But the choice was cinched when I met Lt. Col. John Phillips, commander, and two other old 1st Air Cavalry Division and Fort Benning friends soon after arrival, and found that the chow was exceptionally good.
I'd found an outfit and in Vietnam, that means a home and a family.
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