SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for the Period Ending 30 April 1971. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

PARAGRAPH 2

Lessons Learned

1.(U) PERSONNEL: None

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

1. Observation: Many agent reports were being received on secure teletype 2 to 3 days after they were reported to U.S. agent handlers. This, added to the time between an agent making an observation and his reporting to his handler, made much of the information 5 to 7 days old before it was in the hands of 3/17 ACS elements operating in the field who could exploit the information.
2. Evaluation: With the constantly changing situation in a combat zone, many of these agent reports were useless because the reported enemy unit had moved out of the area before 3/17 ACS elements received the information. A closer liaison with intelligence units operating within the 3/17 ACS area of operation was necessary.
3. Recommendation: Air Cavalry units should be supplied with the location of MI field offices within their area of operation and these same field be briefed as to the U.S. units operating within their Area of Operation to better facilitate the dissemination of information. Also both the field offices and user units should take it upon themselves to establish a liaison system.
4. Command Action: Liaison has been established between 3/17 ACS and a field team operating out of Phu Loi. As they receive the information typewritten copies are forwarded directly to 3/17 ACS. Using this system, it has been possible to cut the time span from the agent making an observation until the user unit receives it to as little as 12 hours.

3. (U) OPERATIONS

1. Observation #1
   1. Observation: The need for a practical, safe and attractive base for our revetments was solved when this unit hauled in gravel for that purpose.
   2. Evaluation: The use of gravel greatly reduces the possibility of an accident. As with PSP, or any other metal base, there is always the possibility of catching a skid shoe and causing an accident. The use of gravel also alleviates the possibility of the aircraft skidding or sliding on a wet or oily surface. Since this unit installed the gravel, there have been absolutely no drainage problems.
   3. Recommendation: That all units take a look at their revetments to find if any of these potentially dangerous situations exist. If so, recommend that they consider the possibility of reforming their revetments with at least six inches of gravel.
   4. Command Action: None.
2. Observation #2
   1. Observation: Immediately after experiencing an engine failure in an AH-1G, the gunner attempted to jettison the wing stores and was unable to do so.
   2. Evaluation: Subsequent investigation determined that the gunner's jettison switch was defective. Since the incident, we have been testing the jettison system on all our AH-1G's. Another was found to have a faulty salvo jettison time delay relay. A test or check of the wing stores jettison system is not included in any of the periodic maintenance inspection checklists. In testing the impulse cartridge receptacle for activation of the electrical current, the inboard system will register a continuous current, however, the outboard system registers only sudden electrical impulses as the salvo mode is activated. Unless the impulse is observed, it may be thought that the outboard system is not receiving the activation current.
   3. Recommendation: That a check of the wing store jettison system be included in the preventive maintenance periodic inspection so that it will be tested at least every 100 hours.
   4. Command Action: None.
3. Observation #3
   1. Observation: The use of a light fire team of UH-1G's as a visual reconnaissance team is ___ _____ ___, unproductive and wastes valuable blade hours on the aircraft.
   2. Evaluation: The altitude and airspeed which an AH-1G must fly prevents any detailed observations of the terrain especially in densely wooded areas. The size of the aircraft also presents a large target for enemy gunners while flying at an altitude low enough to attempt a visual reconnaissance.
   3. Recommendation: That a light fire team of UH-1G's not be used as a visual reconnaissance team.
   4. Command Action: None.
4. Observation #4
   1. Observation: During A Troops tenure in Cambodia, ground to air fire usually did not start until early afternoon.
   2. Evaluation: The majority of all ground to air fire A Troop has had, had been in the afternoon. Evidently, the enemy knows that late in the day we cannot concentrate full firepower on the area because of the relatively short time until darkness falls. He knows that we must then break contact. The only times any of our aircraft have been fired on in the morning is when the scout has uncovered something important or we have been in support of troops in contact.
   3. Recommendation: Trying to get the most VR hours in the morning would be one solution. Also, since the afternoon reconnaissance is a must, try and save your VR blocks closest to your base for this time. If a ship did go down your QRF and Pipesmoke-Chinook element would be closer at hand and darkness would not then be such an overriding factor as it would be in an area a long distance from your base.
   4. Command Action: None.

4. (U) Organization: None.

5.(U) Training: None.

6.(U) Logistics

1. Observation #1
   1. Observation: With the phase out of the U.S. effort in III MR no support units remain to maintain aircraft rearming and refueling facilities at forward bases.
   2. Evaluation: The withdrawal of the 1st Air Cavalry Division resulted in the close out of divisional support elements which operated aircraft rearming and refueling facilities at Quan Loi, Lai Khe and Loc Ninh. As a result this squadron was directed by the 12th Aviation Group to assume responsibility for the facilities of this squadron.
   3. Recommendation: That QM and ordnance detachments be attached to this squadron for the operation of fixed rearming and refueling facilities.
   4. Command Action: This squadron has requested to 12th Aviation Group (Combat) that support detachments be attached.
2. Observation #2
   1. Observation: No installation engineer support was made available to A Troop, 3/17 ACS at Quan Loi.
   2. Evaluation: The original movement of A Troop to Quan Loi in August 1970 was intended for a period of only two to three months. However, the location of A Troop at Quan Loi was extended for an indefinite period. Due to the fact that all real property at Quan Loi belongs to ARVN, no installation engineer support is available.
   3. Recommendation: Provisions should be developed under which PA&E installation engineer support can be provided to U.S. units located on ARVN bases.
   4. Command Action: This squadron has requested thru 12th Aviation Group (Combat) that PA&E support be made available to A Troop at Quon Loi.

7.(U) Communications: None

8.(U) Material: None.

9.(U) Other

1. Observation #1
   1. Observation: During the period 2 November 1970 to 10 April 1971 the 3/17th ACS was OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division and further OPCON to the 1/9 Air Cavalry Squadron.
   2. Evaluation: Initially, this arrangement caused no command and control problems as the 1/9 Squadron Commander was the senior commander. However, in January 1971, the 1/9 changed commanders. The new commander was junior to the commander of the 3/17 but no change was made in the command relationship between the two units. Had the two commanders not worked together previously and had they not been thoroughly mission oriented conflicts could have arisen.
   3. Recommendation: When one unit is placed under the Operational Control of another, the unit with the senior commander should be the controlling unit.
   4. Command Action: None.

CARL J. HAALAND
LTC, FA
Commanding

NAME OF AWARD

RECOMMENDED

APPROVED

PENDING

DOWN GRADED

MEDAL OF HONOR

0

0

0

0

DSC

0

0

0

0

SS

5

2

3

2

LM

1

0

1

0

DFC

24

15

5

4

SM

13

0

13

0

BSM"V"

15

0

15

0

BSM

99

75

15

9

AM"V"

6

6

0

0

AM

175

174

1

0

ARCOM"V"

4

0

4

0

ARCOM

531

309

222

0

PH

6

7

0

0

TOTAL

879

639

279

15

ENEMY UNIT

CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION

MR-6 HQ

Vic AN 8850

MR-7 HQ

SE of GIA RAY

BA LONG (P) HQ

NE of NUI MAY TAO

445 VC MT Inf Bn

Vic Nui BE w/1 company in LONG ___

33 NVA Inf Regt

HQ & Spt Units

South of NUI ONG

1 NVA Inf Bn

South of NUI ONG

2 NVA Inf Bn

SE of Vo Dat

3 NVA Inf Bn

East of Blackhorse

274 VC Inf Bn

HQ & Spt Units

N HAT DICH AND BINH SON area

1 VC Inf Bn

SE of XUAN LOC

2 VC Inf Bn

South of ____ ______

3 VC Inf Bn

SE of Binh Sen plantation

MR-10 HQ

North of ___ ___

BINH LONG (P) HQ

NE of AN LOC

368 VC LF Inf Bn

Dispersed NE of AN LOC

PHUC LONG (P) HQ

BU GIA MAP

K 28 District Unit

Vic BU GIA MAP

SR 5 HQ

Western War Zone "D"

1 DONG NAI VC MF Inf Bn

PHU DIAO (D)

2 DONG NAI NVA Inf Bn

TAN UYEN (D)

4 DONG NAI NVA Inf Bn

CHAU THANH (D)

5^th VC Inf Div

HQ & Spt Units

NW of SNOUL, Cambodia

E6 Regt

NE of SNOUL, Cambodia

174 NVA Inf Regt

SW of SNOUL, Cambodia

22 Arty Bn

Vic of SNOUL, Cambodia

24 AA Bn

NW of Bu Dep

27 Recon Bn

NW of SNOUL, Cambodia

95 Sapper Bn

Vic of SNOUL, Cambodia

7 NVA Inf Div

Hq & Spt Units

Chup Plantation, Cambodia

141 NVA Inf Regt

NE of Chup Plantation, Cambodia

165 NVA Inf Regt

NE of Chup Plantation, Cambodia

209 NVA Inf Regt

Vic of SUONG, Cambodia

22 Arty Bn

NE of Chup Plantation, Cambodia

24 AA Bn

NE of Chup Plantation, Cambodia

95 Sapper Bn

Chup Plantation, Cambodia

9 VC Inf Bn

HQ & Supt Units

NE of Chup Plantation, Cambodia

95C NVA Inf Regt

SE of Chup Plantation, Cambodia

271 VC Inf Regt

Chup Plantation, Cambodia

272 VC Inf Bn

W of Chup Plantation, Cambodia

22 Arty Bn

E of Chup Plantation, Cambodia

24 AA Bn

E of Chup Plantation, Cambodia

95 Sapper Bn

Chup Plantation, Cambodia