Pipe Dream:

The Ideal Air Cavalry Squadron Employment


The fragmentation of the 3/17th Air Cavalry into its component troops and platoons for different missions in different areas was a fact of war in Vietnam. The problem was widely known, well understood, and largely unsolved by the military leaders at division, field force, and corps level in Vietnam. General Donn Starry, commander of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam, and a widely respected authority on cavalry operations in the U.S. military, stated the problem thusly:

Air Cavalry Operations

As a necessary complement to ground armored forces, air cavalry units brought a new dimension to the Vietnam conflict. The first air cavalry unit, the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, exploited the concept and literally wrote the book on air cavalry operations. Few other air cavalry units, particularly those with divisional cavalry squadrons, were assigned air cavalry roles at first; instead, they were used to escort airmobile operations - like armed helicopter companies. After the armor study and the assignment of more experienced and innovative commanders, air cavalry troops finally began to operate in air cavalry missions. Quite often, however, rotation of commanders, particularly senior commanders, required that lessons be relearned time and again. There was thus a continuing discussion on the proper role and the command of air cavalry units.

In units that properly used air cavalry, operations followed a daily pattern. Upon receipt of information indicating enemy activity, an air reconnaissance was conducted by the troop to determine whether or not further exploitation by ground forces was required. If ground reconnaissance was desired, the troop commander usually committed his aerorifle platoon. A standby reserve force could be called by the troop commander if the situation required. The air cavalry troop commander controlled all reaction forces until more than one company from a supporting unit was committed. At that time, control passed to the commander responsible for the area, and the operation was conducted like a typical ground or airmobile engagement, often with the air cavalry remaining in support. Major General John J. Tolson, Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, clearly stated his feelings about air cavalry: "I cannot emphasize how valuable this unit (1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry) has been to me as division commander. Over 50 percent of our major contacts have been initiated by actions of this squadron."

To be successful, air cavalry operations had to be swiftly followed by ground or airmobile elements of the division or regiment. Unfortunately in many units with air cavalry, reported leads were frequently not followed up. Consequently, many air cavalry units adopted the unofficial practice of developing leads that could be handled by the air cavalry itself.

In October 1967, two air cavalry squadrons, the 3d and 17th Squadrons, 17th Cavalry, arrived. Because they were the first units of their type to be assigned to U.S. infantry divisions in Vietnam, their integration into the force was accomplished with some difficulty. Most problems reflected a lack of knowledge on the part of the division commander and staff concerning capabilities, limitations, and basic support needs of air cavalry squadrons. There was an unfortunate tendency to use the aircraft for command and control and for transportation in airmobile operations rather than for reconnaissance. At the outset, therefore, air cavalry was not used to best advantage, and there was some misuse. Only after commanders became more aware of the capabilities of their air cavalry squadrons was proper employment achieved, and in some cases the process was slow and painful.

- - -Starry, General Donn A., Armored Combat in Vietnam, Indianapolis, IN, 1980. Pages 111-112.

The 3/17th Air Cavalry did not solve the problem of fragmentation and the misuse of an air cavalry squadron's capabilities for quite some time, if at all. The question of exactly how one uses an air cavalry squadron as a real air cavalry squadron was still being asked in August 1969, almost two years after the 3/17th arrived in Vietnam. In letter found in the 3/17th Air Cavalry file at the Military History Institute at Carlisle, PA, LTC John Fitch, Redhorse 6, addressed the issue of employing a real air cavalry squadron in III Corps, Vietnam as a hypothetical question. Redhorse 6 staffed and wargamed an imaginary squadron operations order and area of operation that assigned the 3/17th to an economy of force mission in a section of II Corps. In sergeant's terms, the question he sought to answer was "how big a chunk of ground could the 3/17th's three air cavalry troops and one cavalry troop cover in III Corps, Vietnam, if we got what we needed for support and didn't have to constantly send part of the squadron off to fight a fire someplace?"

The annexes to the letter detail the all of the assumed operations of the squadron's scouts, guns, cavalry, and aerorifle elements, but they have been lost from the file. However, the main letter explains enough to give at least a general understanding of how Redhorse 6 wanted to use his air cavalry squadron to fight the war in Vietnam.

LTC Fitch, to his everlasting credit, was right on the money in addressing the issues raised by General Starry over twenty years later. It is not clear whether LTC Fitch was asked by 12th Combat Aviation Group to recommend how to use an air cavalry squadron, or whether LTC Fitch forwarded his study to advocate a change in the current practice. But the letter concludes that the 3/17th Air Cavalry, as a whole unit, could cover 400 square kilometers all by itself, calling in infantry division support only when the fight got to be a big one. He put the ARVN troops assigned to the 3/17th as reaction force out in front in ground contact, letting them carry the burden of the ground fights.

The letter stands as testimony that Redhorse 6, in 1969, studied and put forward a proposal to use the 3/17th Air Cavalry as a real air cavalry squadron. General Starry may well have had the 3/17th Air Cavalry in mind when he wrote: "Only after commanders became more aware of the capabilities of their air cavalry squadrons was proper employment achieved, and in some cases the process was slow and painful."


DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3RD SQUADRON, 17TH CAVALRY
APO 96289



AVBACA-G 5 August 1969

SUBJECT: Air Cavalry Employment

Commanding Officer
12th Combat Aviation Group
APO 96226


  1. PROBLEM: To determine the coverage capability of an air cavalry squadron wile performing an economy of force mission.
  2. ASSUMPTIONS
    1. The squadron's fixed base of operations will continue to be DiAn.
    2. Logistical support will continue to be DiAn.
    3. One ARVN company will be attached to each troop on a daily basis to augment the troops' organic ground combat capability.
    4. Three additional UH-1H aircraft will be attached to each troop on a daily basis to augment the troops' organic lift capability.
    5. Artillery and tactical air support will be available throughout the area of operation.
    6. Squadron air and ground assets will be available to perform screening missions for ground elements in the squadron area of operation.
    7. Organic air cavalry troops will be capable of maintaining 1900-2100 flying hours per month.
    8. Squadron's organic ground cavalry troop will be utilized throughout the area of operation.
    9. POL and rearmament facilities will be established in forward areas which will decrease reaction time.
    10. Squadron will not be tasked to perform missions outside of its area of operations.
    11. THE WAR WILL NOT END.
  3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.
    1. Frequency of AO coverage depends on AO size, terrain, vegetation, and weather conditions.
    2. AO coverage is required on a 24 hour per day basis.
    3. Size of the AO is highly dependent on terrain and enemy situation.
    4. Logistical support must be adequate for a sustained operation.
    5. In order to retain maximum crew efficiency for both daylight and night operations, a 100% TOE personnel fill must be maintained at all times.
    6. Additional interpreter support will be required while working with attached ARVN's.
  4. DISCUSSION
    1. In order to evaluate the area coverage within which an air cavalry squadron is capable of conducting a sustained economy of force mission, this study was staffed and data compiled on an imaginary squadron operations order and area of operation (see Annex A) [editor's note: the Annexes are missing from my copy.]. The AO was further divided into two individual troop sectors, with one troop assigned to each sector daily, and one troop assigned the entire squadron AO for night missions. The troops would be rotated on a ten day cycle, thereby assigning each troop the night mission once during a thirty day period. For this reason a simulated ten day sustained mission has been outlined by the troops as seen in Annexes B through D. In addition to their organic capabilities, each troop was augmented daily with an ARVN company and three UH-1H aircraft to be utilized as a ready reaction force.
    2. Troop Deployment:
      1. The Hunter-Killer concept, consisting of one AH-1G and one OH-6A, is the basic method to be employed in accomplishing the daylight mission.
      2. Each troop area of operation will be sub-divided into individual team sectors, allowing the scouts to become thoroughly familiar with the terrain and enhancing their ability to detect any new activity in their sector.
      3. Visual reconnaissance sightings will be fully developed by the troop rifle platoon and the on call ready reaction forces as deemed appropriate by the troop commanders.
      4. When enemy activity is sighted and contact is established, fire teams can be deployed by combining other VR teams from troop assets.
      5. From the data submitted in Annexes B, C, and D, it is determined that complete coverage of a troop AO will be accomplished every second or third day by the daylight teams, and the same time span for the night mission troop depending upon which technique is used.
      6. Rotation of troops throughout the small squadron AO eliminates a set pattern of reconnaissance in a certain area.
      7. The troop responsible for night reconnaissance will employ one of three techniques depending on equipment available (see Annex F for explanation of night techniques).
      8. The squadron's organic ground cavalry troop is capable of conducting road clearing, convoy escort and security, FSB security, night ambush, road reconnaissance, and reinforcing missions throughout the entire area of operations. Because of its lack of tracked vehicles, the troops' cross country capability is rather limited. However the above mentioned missions are conducted very successfully. Although the troop would rely on squadron for its air support during enemy contact, it does have the capability of supplying its own indirect fire support within 5000 meters of its mortars. The troop can be used to reinforce the air cavalry troops' airmobile capabilities by being utilized as an airlifted infantry or by reinforcing ground elements and could be extensively used as a security force for forward aircraft laager positions, POL and rearmament points, and providing radio relay.
      9. Average flying time per troop for the ten day period is 65.5-70 hours daily or 65.5-70 hours total.
      10. Average troop ammunition expenditures is shown in Annex G.
    3. Advantages of employing an air cavalry troop in a squadron AO:
      1. Provides coverage over a larger area than is possible with piecemeal employment of the squadron.
      2. Squadron and troop commanders would have a free hand in employing their squadron and troops.
      3. All elements of the troop would be thoroughly familiar with their sector.
      4. Squadron would have the flexibility to reinforce and shift emphasis throughout the AO and to cross attach forming small task forces for specialized missions.
      5. Instant reaction to enemy contact.
      6. Frees major U.S. ground forces and allows ARVN elements to perform the majority of the ground fighting.
    4. Disadvantages:
      1. Less ground security at night for indigenous population in the AO.
      2. Reduces squadron capability to react throughout III Corps area.
      3. Takes cavalry support away from control of divisional ground units.
      4. Requires greater reliance on non U.S. ground forces which could cause language and coordination problems.
  5. CONCLUSIONS.
    1. An air cavalry squadron, augmented by the assumed reaction forces and logistical support, is capable of conducting a sustained and comprehensive economy of force mission in an area approximately 400 square kilometers. In areas of lesser vegetation, such as the Delta, the size of a squadron AO would be greatly increased. Similarly, in areas of dense vegetation with triple canopy cover, the size of a squadron AO would have to be reduced.
    2. Utilizing its organic troops to their maximum, employment of an air cavalry squadron in this manner provides a coordinated 24 hours a day intelligence picture, a rapid dissemination of enemy intelligence, and the ability to react with ground troops of sufficient size and backup potential to make and sustain contact with the enemy.
  6. RECOMMENDATIONS.
    1. That air cavalry squadrons be assigned areas of operation of the size and type considered by this study.
    2. That assigned areas of operation be reduced or increased proportionately, dependent on the nature of the terrain.
    3. That ARVN forces and necessary aircraft as described in paragraphs 2c and 2d be attached to air cavalry squadrons to be utilized on a daily basis as a ready reaction force.

JOHN B. FITCH
LTC
Commanding


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