From the (Red)Horse's Mouth

Nathan called about a month ago and asked if I would speak to you today. I told him I doubted I could match the stirring talk that Harve Turner made last year when my wife Rosaleen and I attended in Tampa. He told me not to worry. He had to follow Harve that year I could do the same this year.

Harve joined the squadron when it was organized at Ft. Knox in 1967. He stayed with it in Vietnam until October 1968. I was at Knox in 1967 and could see their helicopters parked at Godman airfield across the Dixie Dieway from the backyard of my quarters. I wanted to join one of those new squadrons if I was assigned to Vietnam and I got my wish. It hardly seems like 33 years and 8 months since that happened. At the time I was a young Lt Colonel, then still full of piss and vinegar as compared to the old fart I am now. I went to Vietnam in August 1968. First as the Operations Officer in USARV Aviation at the Long Binh. In November I learned that I was to command the 3/17th in January.

A letter of 23 December 68:

This afternoon I visited my new unit. It looks like I'll really enjoy this assignment. They are top notch - lots of pride, very professional. I always thought being a battalion commander would be one of the best jobs you could have. Higher commands are OK, but in these you lose touch with your men A battalion commander's every word is of great importance to those under him, yet he knows, and is known, on a personal basis by nearly every man in his unit. I enjoyed being a troop commander of armored cavalry, but that will be nothing compared to the command of an air cavalry squadron. As a staff officer you can be compared with a civilian, but a commander's job is unique. There are many opportunities to make mistakes, and if you do they can be serious. Not only can they ruin your career, but in a combat environment they can ruin the lives of others. It is a challenge, and one for which I've been working for 15 years. Most people are motivated by money. They wouldn't understand a man who wants a job that doesn't pay much and yet carries a lot of risk to his career and maybe his life. And I am not talking about just officers, but also the dedicated Warrant Officers and above all the NCO's who were and are the backbone of the Army.

The change of command went off without a hitch on 15 January 1969. Jack Phillips was visibly moved when his green shoulder tabs were put on me. It looked like he wanted to cry. I had taped my speech the night before. Then it came out a little different but everyone seemed happy. I don't remember what I said. So I assumed command and felt like I was walking three feet off the ground.

Right off I was hit with a problem. The Deputy CG of II Field Forces, would be by to see me that afternoon to talk about aircraft availability in A Troop. II Field Forces was the equivalent of a corps. They commanded all the divisions and other units in that part of Vietnam and were tied in with the South Vietnamese units.

A Troop, one of three air cavalry troops, each with 27 helicopters, was based at Di An and supported both the 3d Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division in the northern part of the Delta as well as the Capital Assistance Military Command in and around Saigon. B Troop was based with the 9th Division HQ at Dong Tam in the Delta, about 40 miles south. C Troop, based at Di An, usually supported operations of the 25th Infantry Division at Tay Ninh, about 35 miles northeast of Di An and near Cambodia as well as the 1st Infantry Division at Lai Khe, closer by. D troop, ground cavalry and mounted in jeeps instead of helicopters, was based at Bien Hoa AFB and totally beyond my control. They provided air base security as well as personnel for Long Range Patrols.

Besides the regular troops, the command was augmented with transportation and avionics maintenance detachments to provide field level support. We operated a heliport and a fuel and ammo depot. All told I commanded about 1000 men, including 88 helicopters.

Although we supported various divisions and commands, our immediate boss was 12th Aviation Group. Besides my Air Cav Squadron there were five other aviation battalions in the group - an attack battalion (all Cobra gunships), three medium lift battalions (all Huey troop carriers), and a transport battalion ( twin rotor CH-47 Chinooks that carried up to 46 troops). We were the corps level aviation support for II Field Force, although the colonel who was group commander reported directly to the 1st Aviation Brigade CG, who was also the USARV Aviation Officer with over 4000 Army helicopters to worry about.

It is important to understand this relationship. It explains how the squadron CO was able to do his job. He had to stand up to bird colonels and generals who thought they knew better about how to employ helicopters and often told him so, sometimes putting him at attention. Fortunately the Group CO wrote my efficiency report. Better yet, he supported us all the way and he could do that because his ER was written by the USARV CG who also supported us all the way. It wasn't just me. The Redhorse Squadron had made a name for itself before I came along and no two-star groundpounder infantry division CG could put us down. We were one of the elite units in Vietnam.

But it was my responsibility to assure that we kept our reputation. Another letter:

After supper that evening my XO, Bob Haley, and I went to the heliport to see how A Troop was doing with night aircraft maintenance. They had been the first big problem for me in my two days of command. The first day they had only two flyable (out of nine) Cobras. Today they had had only one. They were supposed to support the Capital Military Command (around Saigon) and the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division each with two hunter-killer teams (1 Cobra and 1 LOH) per day, meaning they needed a minimum of 4 flyable Cobras every day. I couldn't take aircraft from my other two troops because they were fully committed. So there had been strong complaints through command channels, which is why Gen Richardson had visited us.

I had met Dick Zimmerman a couple of years before at Ft Knox. He was then a young captain. He impressed me as a dedicated officer so I was happy to find him in command of A Troop. I had several talks with him plus pressure from the XO, Bob Haley, and my S-3, Bud Saunders. They were now working hard to get their Cobras flying. As of that evening they were back up to three flyable and working on two more, one of which they were to test fly that night, even if it took all night. They hooked up lights and worked in a large tent as well as out in the open. Not an ideal situation but they could do it if necessary. They just hadn't been pushed before. I was prepared to threaten Zimmerman with being relieved of his command but it seemed he had gotten the message.

The next evening I flew on an operational night mission with him. The two of us in his OH-6 LOH to Tan Thuy in the Delta, about 30 miles south. We left at 1900 and didn't get back until 0230. We learned that night that he was to switch his support from the 9th Division to the 25th that same morning. I flew that afternoon to Bien Hoa to visit Delta Troop. But we no sooner arrived than I got some disastrous news. Major Zimmerman and his operations officer, Lt Taylor, had been killed. They were flying in the same aircraft we had been in the night before. They flew toward Tay Ninh to inspect their new area of operations and were either forced down by enemy fire, had a mechanical problem, or they had landed for some other reason. They were both shot and the helicopter caught fire. This was to be my first such tragic experience and there would be many others in the next seven months. I don't remember why we didn't fly to the accident site instead of returning directly to Di An. In subsequent occurrences I always flew to the site.

To this day I still feel guilty about losing Dick Zimmerman and Lt Taylor. Maybe I had leaned on him too much and he was tired and made a bad judgment. Had I relieved him of command he might be alive today. Also, I feel guilty about thinking at the time that a problem had been solved, although in a manner that I would never have wanted. That same afternoon I put the best person I could think of, Major Bud Saunders, in command of A Troop. He did an excellent job over the next few months and I later moved him to be my XO when Bob Haley went home.

This brings me to my number one priority for the squadron. Despite our outstanding operational reputation we also had a more infamous one. When I assumed command of the squadron it had the worst accident record of any aviation unit in Vietnam. So reducing that statistic was foremost. Enemy action that killed Dick Zimmerman didn't count. But every death or major accident hurt. In the seven months I had the squadron we lost 17 men killed. This is five more than we list on our web site honor role for that period. But it is the total from my letters.. I believe the discrepancy is that those five were not killed in aircraft incidents. Three were blown up offloading 40mm grenades from a truck in our ammo dump, one fell off a bridge and drowned while on a patrol, and one was hit by a truck at night. But they all were probably avoidable and they hurt. I didn't record their names in my letters so we probably can't find them on the Wall.

Of the seven aircraft incidents that accounted for the twelve deaths on our honor role, four were not combat losses and probably preventable. A LOH ran out of gas, a Cobra mid-air with an AF OV-10, a Cobra mysteriously descended into trees after take-off, a new LOH pilot went joy-riding. He was found two days later.

There were many other noncombat incidents that didn't result in death but escalated our safety record. But one recorded combat really wasn't. I flew to the scene of a downed LOH. The Troop CO was there and there were bullet holes in the tail rotor. Months later the CO confessed to me what actually happened. While on a mission the scout saw a flare chute on the ground. They landed and stowed it. But you remember we flew without doors. The chute blew out and wrapped around the tail rotor, causing a non injury crash. When the Troop CO got there he shot holes in the tail rotor. I had been raising Hell with my Troop CO's to reduce the accident rate and he did so.

So I leaned hard on the COs and my Sergeant Major rode herd on the NCOs and we had lots of safety meetings. But you don't want to dampen their enthusiasm and esprit. And I don't think we did. The real problem was the way we had to operate. At any hour of the day or night there might be as many as six two-helo teams scattered within a fifty mile radius from Dian. The team leader might be a Capt., but more likely a Lt. or a Warrant Officer. And these were gung-ho kids in their early 20s. At 38 I was really "the old man".

Finally in July 69, my last full month as Redhorse 6, the troopers gave me a present. No accidents at all! I believe that was a first for the squadron since the arrival in Nam. But I heard there were two after I left August 7th.

Having to parcel out our assets to various ground units was very frustrating. Occasionally there were troop level operations and they were very successful. But never any at squadron level. And the worst was the complete loss of Delta Troop. We did a what/if study of how the squadron could be employed as a unit and the size of the sector we could control. It went to II Field Forces and I guess it was never implemented. I was surprised to find the study on our web site a couple of years ago. (Cf. Pipedream)

Of the units we supported the 9th Division in the Delta at Dong Tam was our biggest problem. They were the epitome of the McNamara era bean counters. They personified all that was wrong with the war. They gave the B Troop CO, Maj Wally Napier, a hard time and I didn't like it. I had many confrontations with them and fortunately the 12th Group CO backed me. B Troop was under opcon of the 9th. We provided maintenance support for them out of Di An but the 9th wanted to assume that too. They had their own organic air cav troop and were claiming higher flying hours and better aircraft availability. I felt like B Troop was holding its own. They had 1800 flying hours in January, 400-500 more than my other two troops, and many more VC kills. Their availability rate was lower but that was to be expected because of more flying. In a letter I wrote:

We are still having a big flap over B Troop. Their maintenance is good and they are doing a good job. The 9th Div, though, is trying to fly their aircraft into the ground and gets on them for not having an 80% availability. I went to the chief of staff and it was some experience. He yelled and pounded the table, swore at me. . . The troop commander is caught in the middle. . . II Field Force put out a policy that air cav troops would fly a maximum of 60 hours per day per aircraft, but B Troop flew 103 hours several days ago and 91 hours a couple of days later. They flew 1800 hours for the month. My other troops flew only 1300-1400 hours. The 9th Div has an air cav troop of their own. They regularly fly it 80-90 hours/day and show 80% availability. We think they aren't maintaining high standards of maintenance. I told the chief of staff that B Troop had an excellent record - no forced landings nor other accidents for any reason but enemy fire for over two months, plus a very low incidence of unscheduled maintenance. He said, "I don't want to hear all that horse shit!" He can't complain about support. They are flying their missions and killing a lot of VC. Yesterday they killed 36. I suspect this morning may not have been the best time to be arguing with him because one of their own gunships had misfired some rockets that killed six US and wounded another 27. I was sure glad my troop wasn't responsible.

I mentioned that we had some very successful troop level operations. One was under the command of Maj Bill Slusher, C Troop. He had been pushing them on night missions. They really had a good night the 25th of April by the Cambodian border south of Tay Ninh. A bunch of enemy in the open trying to attack fire base Frontier City. It had been established for the express purpose of encouraging the communists to come across the border. Which they did. Not only were we prepared for the attack, we also had news coverage arranged. They came across in force. The C Troop team, with two Hueys added, each with 50 cal machine guns and a battery of lights on one, plus an extra cobra, knocked out five 82mm mortar positions firing on the fire base from this side of the border. Later they were given permission to cross the border in pursuit and caught about 50 enemy in the open with their lights. They had a confirmed body count of 17 but we expected a higher count after friendly troops swept the area in the daylight. Of course, we couldn't enter Cambodia to count bodies.

I debriefed Captain Thomas who headed up our team. He said they spotted a convoy of trucks about five miles inside Cambodia parked along the road waiting for the troops to return. He didn't fire on them because he figured they had a lot of antiaircraft weapons. He wanted to call in Air Force jets but they couldn't get permission to cross the border. We had lots of Air Force support on our side of the border plus some extra cobras from other aviation units. The entire action probably resulted in several hundred enemy killed. We had been under strict orders to avoid offensive actions within 3 miles of the Cambodian border on account of diplomatic moves to get Cambodia into the peace talks. But if the enemy initiated the action then division commanders had the authority to return fire and even across the border. Hence, the lure of setting up a new fire base to provoke an attack. It worked.

I have a lot more I could talk about but you have probably had enough. Just one more vignette from the best tour of duty I ever had in 28 years in the Army.

It was now the 26th of July 1969 and I was getting some more information about a VIP whose name I couldn't divulge. Few details except that he would want to talk to people. Much more information the next day. He would land in my heliport, then get in a jeep to observe some 1st Infantry troops. Then they would drive back between our lines of aircraft to the end, where he would dismount and I would report to him. After that he would ask a lot of questions and shake a lot of hands.

As for operational matters, my squadron was to be responsible for aerial security of the Saigon - Di An area all afternoon, with our three aerorifle platoons on stand-by alert for the unlikely possibility of the helicopter being shot or forced down between Saigon and Di An. I expected it to be an interesting afternoon and a great finale for my year in Vietnam.

More instructions next day. I had to meet with a 1st Division general to make last minute arrangements. For his visit we were to have 12 helicopters lined up on each lane in the revetments, with the crews standing at attention in front of them. I was to be out in front at one end, with my sergeant major and troop commanders behind me. He was to pass slowly by the helicopters, then stop in front of me and I was to report. The helicopter crews were to assemble in what the general called a "gaggle" behind us and the VIP would probably shake some hands and say a few words. The press was to be cordoned off by MPs but close enough to take pictures.

I was specifically instructed that we were to wear the authorized soft caps instead of our black Stetsons. The 1st Div Public Information Officer agreed with me that the Cav hats would be much more interesting to the press but he couldn't change the decision.

It was now the 29th of July and I was only about a week away from leaving Nam. But I had to have an early evening briefing for the troop COs and my staff concerning our air surveillance operations in the Saigon-Di An corridor that actually began that morning. All the troops were involved in this. We would have firefly teams in the air all night this evening and in the morning would check rooftops in the Saigon and surrounding areas.

It was finally Wednesday the 30th and everything seemed to be going well. We had not had any enemy contact overnight and I wasn't surprised. Even if they had found out what was up I didn't think they could react to it. Everything they did was planned weeks in advance. Shortly before noon we went on a red alert to get all foreign nationals off the base and beef up local security. Then I was able to brief our troops that we would be visited by the president, Richard Nixon. I believe most had already guessed who was coming.

Nixon and his wife, Pat, had been secretly flown to Bangkok, along with others from Washington like Henry Kissenger and members of the White House press. They were to arrive at Tan Son Nhut at 1 PM and go to the presidential palace to meet with Thieu, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, the MACV commander General Creighton Abrams and others. Pat Nixon was to visit an orphanage and the evacuation hospital. The president and the rest of the party were to be flown by helicopter to Di An. They were supposed to arrive at 1630 but it was moved forward to 3:30 PM.

We were able to line up only 22 of our helicopters for the review because all the others were out flying the protective mission. Some of those left were not flyable and had to be towed into position. We also rounded up what people we had left and had about 190 in the heliport. I had worried about the weather. It was cloudy overcast but we had just one brief downpour early in the afternoon. Then about 3 PM the sun came out and we had the best weather I had seen in weeks. My observation at the time was that this president was on a roll and riding a lucky streak. Of course, Watergate was over three years away.

The visitors arrived on time in 12th Group helicopters. There were a couple of decoy aircraft with Secret Service aboard that landed first. Then the president's helicopter with his personal pilot at the controls. We could see him and the others as they exited the helicopters and got into jeeps. They first went to a nearby area for some ceremonies with 1st Infantry Division soldiers. Before they got to our area I was informed that there was a change in plans and the president would not be stopping to talk with my troops. This was really a let down after all our preparations!

In the nine-jeep convoy that approached our area there were MPs in the first one, Maj Gen Talbott, 1st Div CG in the 2nd , the president in the 3d and then President Thieu, Ambassador Bunker, Gen Abrams and others in the official party were in subsequent vehicles. A huge crowd of the press - I estimated about 200 - were in several buses and got out as the jeeps neared us. As expected, the president passed on by in front of me, but then stopped in front of our first helicopter, got out and started shaking hands and talking to my troops. At this point all Hell broke loose with the press. They didn't stay behind any cordon. Instead, it was a mob scene as they yelled, pushed and shoved to get close to the president with mikes and TV cameras. Gen Talbott got hold of me and said he would introduce me to the president. But we had a lot of trouble getting through the reporters who didn't care if it was a two star general they were elbowing out of the way. I did get introduced and there were lots of mikes shoved in my face. Nixon said the general had told him I had a top notch outfit, or words to that effect. I was so flustered at the time over things not going as planned that about all I could say was, "Yes sir, it sure is a good outfit."

Many of my troops were not as reticent, though. He said to many of them that the general and the colonel had told him they were a good outfit and to a man they all said yes. One major was asked that question and said yes, but that he wasn't part of it. Nixon told him it must really be good if you say so even if you don't belong to it.

One of my troopers told Nixon he had shaken his hand before in Denver and gave the date. The president said he recalled being there at that time. The fellow then asked Nixon if he was following him around.

Despite the raucous press all around him, Nixon seemed to be really enjoying himself. He shook hands and talked to every man he could. If anyone there didn't get to shake his hand it was only because he didn't try very hard. Nixon spent an entire half hour at this. The other dignitaries were all but ignored by the press. Nixon finally got back in his jeep and everyone departed at about 5PM. The official party flew back to Bangkok then but I never found out if they left from Tan Son Nhut or Bien Hoa, their alternate.

In my mind this was the absolute epitome of my year in Vietnam. After a relatively good year the president of the US visited my unit as one of only two on his trip to Vietnam. Obviously our proximity to Saigon was a factor.

But we also suffered in obscurity. The 1st Infantry Division got all the publicity. Many of the radio reports I heard said only that the president had visited an infantry division in Vietnam, not even mentioning Di An, let alone my squadron. Those that did mention the 1st Infantry Div assumed that my squadron was part of it. I believe that had we been able to wear our distinctive headgear they might have noticed. But the 1st Div wanted all the publicity. I believe someone up above forced them to include us in the itinerary. But then they had us out of it until Nixon changed it on his own. Had I spoken up more on TV perhaps we could have gotten more out of it. But I didn't and we were relegated to being a unit of the 1st Div. But at the time I was ready to go home and not in a fighting mood.

The next evening we had some footage of Nixon's visit on our local TV. But the comment was that the gunships belonged to the 1st Infantry Division. I was burned up, of course, but it was a natural error. The 1st Infantry Division would not have gone out of their way to mention that we didn't belong to them. The newsmen were given fact sheets on the units visited but they probably didn't read them.

I turned over command of the Redhorse Squadron on 7 August 1969 to LTC Bob Arnet, whom I had known before at Forts Knox and Hood, and returned to civilization the next day. I don't know how you felt about your tour in Nam, but I was privileged to command perhaps the finest bunch of men that I have ever known. Too many died. I will always have that on my conscience. But they were all proud patriotic soldiers. I guess there were some who didn't want to be in Vietnam. But to a man everyone was proud to be in the 3/17th.

In conclusion I have a couple of comments about the squadron from the two Group commanders who wrote my efficiency reports:

The four troops of the Air Cavalry Squadron operate throughout III Corps Tactical Zone and the northern reaches of IV Corps Tactical Zone. Being the only Air Cavalry Squadron in the area, the elements of the squadron are high visibility units, and their support is continually sought by senior commanders because of their high degree of effectiveness. Despite the fact that they are usually separated operationally they manage to maintain a unity and esprit in the squadron which is remarkable. Each troop maintains high administrative, logistical, and operational standards. The squadron's level of flying hours is above standard, and in view of the level of combat damage habitually sustained by the squadron, the aircraft availability maintained is outstanding. All supported units, US, RVN, or Thai consistently expressed an extremely high degree of satisfaction with the support received. In fact, the major problem was that all units in the area constantly requested squadron support and assets available were inadequate to meet the demands.

Thank you for listening to my ramblings and God bless the Cavalry, past, present and future!